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The growing success of small family farms in Europe before 1930 was found alongside 
large estates. Tenanted estates enjoyed the advantages of the greater incentives of family 
farmers to maximize their production, and the economies of scale for marketing, credit 
or technical improvement of large exploitations.  A particular case is the tenanted estates 
specialized in the production and marketing of wine and using sharecropping contracts. 
Technical changes, the increasing of scale economies in wine production, and the impact 
of Phylloxera after 1870 had an impact in the nature of the contract as landlords 
increasing the control on production.  This paper compares the three specific cases of 
Beaujolais, Catalonia and Tuscany, where tenanted wine producing estates were 
common throughout this period, and the responses of owners and settlers to these 
changes in the long term.  
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1 An earlier version has been presented at the EURHO Conference 2019, París, 10-13 
september 2019.  We wish thank Rolf Bauer for its comments. The authors have 







 The economic significance of sharecropping, a type of farming in which 
families rent small plots of land from a landowner in return for a portion of 
their crop, has been reinterpreted over the past couple of decades.  A long 
tradition of considering the contract as an explanation of agrarian 
backwardness and an obstacle to economic development has been replaced by a 
more favourable view, as a useful contract for resolving problems associated 
with moral hazard or risk2.  The literature has insisted on the advantages of its 
use for a crop such as the vine, whose output is highly sensitive to the quality 
and timing of labour inputs and the fact that the plant can be easily and 
permanently damaged if the operations are badly carried out. Moreover, 
viticulture is very labour intensive and has been difficult to mechanize until 
recently.   Studies on sharecropping in the Tuscan wine region since the Middle 
Ages, or in the Catalonia vineyard in the last two centuries, have shown the 
advantages of this contract, especially when compared to fixed-rent tenancy.3 
However, a limit of these studies is that sharecropping is less common in 
European vineyards than the literature suggests.4 Certain difficulties exist with 
the contract, such as the problem of dividing the harvest, the risks associated 
with specializing in a commercial crop or moving up the quality ladder. In the 
first case, while the costs of supervising the quality of the sharecropper labour 
inputs are lower than for other types of contracts, those related to the division of 
the harvest can be very high, especially when wine quality is important.  On the 
other hand, the fluctuation of grape production is much higher compared to 
 
2 Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck, The Nature of the Farm, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Pres, 2002).  
3 Ackerberg, D. and Maristella Botticini,  'The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early 
Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard or Capital Market Imperfections?' 
Explorations in Economic History 37 (2000): 241—257, for Tuscany, Juan Carmona 
and James Simpson, “The Rabassa Morta in Catalan Viticulture: The Rise and Decline 
of a Long-Term Sharecropping Contract, 1670s—1920s”, The Journal of Economic 
History, 59-2, (1999): 290—315; for Beaujolais, Philip Hoffman “The Economic Theory 
of Sharecropping in Early Modern France”, The Journal of Economic History, 42-1, 
(1984): 155—62.  
4 Carmona, Juan y James Simpson, “Explaining contract choice: vertical coordination, 
sharecropping, and wine in Europe, 1850—1950”, The Economic History Review, 65-3, 
(2012): 887—909.  Garrido, Samuel, Sharecropping was sometimes efficient: 
sharecropping with compensation for improvements in European viticulture”, The 





other products, and family farmers which tend to be risk averse will not 
specialize forcing the landowners to supply a multi-cropping farm to potential 
tenant. Finally, the preference of sharecropping over fixed-rent tenancy usually 
does not take account the possibility that the landowner is not indifferent to 
whether the rent is in kind or in cash, especially when grape quality is high.  
These factors could explain why sharecropping is less common in commercial 
viticulture, and that in certain cases landowners prefer to devise alternative 
labour contracts which can solve the problems associated with transaction costs 
with labour-intensive cultivation. Sharecropping is thus more often found in 
polyculture farms where the vineyard plays a complementary role. 
The factors offered in the previous part explain why the sharecropping 
contract was common in a number of important wine regions such as Beaujolais 
in France, the Italian region of Tuscany (Chianti) or Catalonia in Spain, but 
mainly absent in others. Although the contract originated in the Middle Ages in 
Tuscany, and from the seventeenth century in the other two cases, they not only 
survived without major changes until 1940, but successfully helped displace 
other types of local wine producers, adapted to the profound changes in 
viticulture in this period, and were capable of producing premium wines. For 
the reasons we have already indicated, usual explanations are not enough to 
explain the survival of this form of organization, and we offer a different one.  
One crucial characteristic of wine production in these three regions was its 
concentration in large properties that centralize the production process of all or 
part of the harvest and to enjoy the advantages offered by the integration of the 
production of grape thanks to the nature of the contract which gave to the 
landowners’ great freedom to control the production of sharecroppers.  On the 
other hand, the three regions shared a particularly hilly landscape which made 
labour intensive viticulture and mechanization expensive.  Moreover, the nature 
of the terrain led to high levels of human specificity and explains that most 
sharecroppers remained for very long periods on the same farm. This 
exogenously given long term contracts stand as most important difference with 
similar contracts in tropical plantations or even in the southern United States, 





  In this chapter we will first show the factors that explain the presence 
and absence of sharecropping in viticulture. Next we will show which types of 
contracts vineyard landowners could use to maintain the advantages offered by 
sharecropping without its disadvantages. Finally, we will show how the 
landowners of Beaujolais, Tuscany and Catalonia solved the problems of 
division of harvest, specialization and wine production in a context of technical 
change. We will take especial attention to the role of the supervision of 
sharecroppers in order to favour technical change and the reduction of 
transaction costs.  
SHARECROPPING AND VITICULTURE 
The family farm is the most widespread form of organisation in 
agriculture because of the low costs of supervising labour.  In farming, output is 
highly sensitive to the timing and quality of effort, and often deficiencies in 
these areas only become apparent after the harvest. Even then, it can be difficult 
to determine whether a poor crop was caused by the worker’s negligence or by 
exogenous factors such as adverse weather conditions.5 The family farm 
provides strong incentives for labour to carry out tasks diligently and members 
can acquire over time important human asset specific skills linked to their land, 
which allows them to be more productive than if they have to keep changing 
farms each year.6  Furthermore, until recently there were few economies of scale 
in most types of agriculture, allowing the family farm to compete successfully 
with large estates or plantations.7 In addition, the fact that workers prefer to 
work their own land in order to increase their incomes and gain security for old 
age implies that in traditional economies the majority of farms are worked by 
their owners.   Therefore, in order to be viable, land or labor contracts have to 
replicate the advantages that family farms enjoy.   The major advantage of rental 
contracts is that they provide the best incentives for farmers to maximise 
output, but not to maintain soil fertility, or care for fixed assets (buildings, trees, 
 
5 Allen and Lueck, The Nature, 6—7; Yujiro Hayami and Keijiro Otsuka, The Economics 
of Contract Choice. An Agrarian Perspective (Oxford, Clarendon: 1993), 12—16.  
6 For asset specificity, Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: 
Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting (New York, Free Press: 1985), 242.  
7 Ray, Debraj, Development Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1998), 





vines, etc.) compared, for instance, to small landowner cultivators.8  Wage 
labour, at the other end of the spectrum of contract choice, provides fewer 
incentives to apply a sufficient effort and care for fixed assets without the need 
for careful supervision.  Sharecropping, by contrast falls between these 
extremes, and the literature provides two broad additional explanations for the 
contract: risk-sharing, and the presence of market imperfections for inputs 
other than land.  
Agriculture is a risky economic activity, not just because of output 
sensitivity to weather or disease, but also because price variability can have a big 
impact on farm income.  National and international market integration can 
increase income variability as a poor harvest is no longer offset by high local 
prices.  In this sense, the advantage of sharecropping compared to fixed rental 
tenancies, is that it shifts part of the risk of harvest or price failure to a less risk 
averse landowners.9  However, there are a number of objections to the tenant’s 
risk aversion as being the determining factor in contract choice.  First, fixed rent 
tenants can expect to be helped in case of poor harvests.10  Second, recent 
studies have questioned that sharecroppers are more risk averse than fixed rent 
tenants or even the landowners. Small owner-occupiers typically reduce risk by 
using the family endowments of land, labour and capital to produce a variety of 
different income streams, a characteristic found especially in the case of wine, 
whose output fluctuated considerably more than other crops.  In France, as in 
Spain or Italy, most vineyards were minuscule and worked by part-time 
producers.11  Therefore, if large landowners want to attract potential tenants, 
 
8 Allen and Lueck, The Nature, 58—61.   
9 French literature noted the expansion of the contract in times of difficulties. In 
Connord, Fabien, La terre des autres. Le métayage en France depuis 1889 
(Montrouge, Editions du Bourg : 2018),  98—9.  
10 Elizabeth Griffiths and Marc Overton, Farming to Halves. The Hidden History of 
Sharefarming in England from Medieval to Modern Times (Basingstoke, Palgrave: 
2009), 127—30. 
11 In France there were 1.6 million hectares of vines and 1.6 million growers in the 
1900s. Marcel Lachiver, Vins, vignes et vignerons. Histoire du vignoble français 
(Paris, Fayard : 1988), 583. Vine scattering was an additional risk-minimizing device in 
Italy. Giovanni Federico and Pablo Martinelli, “Italy to 1938”, in Wine Globalization: A 
New Comparative History, ed. Kym Anderson and Vicente Pinilla, (Cambridge: 





they had to allow multi-cropping (polyculture) in sufficiently large holding or to 
permit sharecroppers to work outside the exploitation, despite this increasing 
monitoring costs.  For this reason, it was common in France and Tuscany to 
offer farms large enough to employ the sharecropper’s family full time, and 
prohibit them from working elsewhere. 
A second kind of explanations are related to transaction costs.  For Alfred 
Marshall, transaction costs with sharecropping were particularly high, because 
neither the landowner nor tenant received the full marginal return from 
increased labour and capital inputs, encouraging both to be undersupplied.12  
However, the transaction costs associated with effort are actually less on a 
family farm worked by sharecroppers, than using wage labour.  More recently, 
transactions costs explanations have been used for preferring sharecropping 
contracts instead of tenancy when it is possible to damage fixed assets which 
affect future harvests (buildings, trees, soil, etc.). For example, with a crop such 
as the vine, output is highly sensitive to the quality and timing of labour inputs 
and the plant itself can be easily and permanently damaged if the pruning, 
ploughing, and hoeing operations are badly carried out.13 This explains why 
rental contracts were not common in viticulture, while the use of wage labour 
was rare because the close monitoring required to reduce the risks of 
opportunistic behaviour of the workers was too costly for most landowners.14  
However, the relatively high figures for vineyards under fixed rent tenancy 
contracts found in French statistics in  1892 (8%) suggests that the effect was 
limited in certain contexts.15 Sharecropping also created transaction costs 
associated with the division of the harvest, which was an important factor in 
limiting its use with viticulture.16 If the division took place in the vineyard, the 
landowner needed to be present to avoid theft, and ensure that the different 
varieties, together with under- and over-ripe fruit, were divided equally between 
 
12 Alfred Marshall., Principles of Economics : An Introductory Volume (Basingstoke: 
1890 [1990]), 534—37.. 
13 Carmona and Simpson, ‘Rabassa Morta’,292—3. 
14 See especially Jules Guyot, Étude des vignobles de france pour servir a l'enseignement 
mutuel de la viticulture et de la vinification françaises (Paris: 1868), vol.3, 292—3.  
15 Garrido “Sharecropping”, 980.  





the two parties. For exogenous reasons, vineyards were usually highly 
fragmented, and the landowner would have considerable difficulties in 
monitoring a number of geographically dispersed plots throughout the village 
since most were located only on certain part of the hillsides (generally south-
facing), and on marginal land.   The grapes then needed to be transported 
quickly to the landowner’s cellar to avoid fermentation.  A less time-critical 
moment for dividing the harvest was after fermentation, but the possibilities for 
sharecroppers to cheat were even greater. Wine could be stolen, and the small 
scale of production implied that there were usually plenty of wine-making 
facilities in a village for sharecroppers to hide part of their harvest from the 
landowner. As wine quality varied considerably, and good wine could be 
removed before the division by a dishonest tenant and replaced with poorer 
wines brought from elsewhere or even by inferior wines obtained from the 
second pressing, such as vinello in Italy.  Landowners were obliged to accept 
them as rental payment from their tenants, unlike the merchants, who could 
reject inferior wines 
Market imperfections for factor inputs like technical know-how, 
managerial skills or capital provide a third type of explanations. Farm 
management might involve not only organising the timing of activities such as 
the start of the harvest, but also planning responses to exogenous shifts in factor 
and commodity prices, or the appearance of new biological or labour-saving 
technologies, skills that were not easily accessible to sharecroppers. 17  Capital 
market imperfections is another explanation when tenants were too poor to 
accept fixed rental contracts, and sharecropping allowed landowners to advance 
farm equipment and working capital, with the future harvest used as security.18 
However sharecroppers on occasions also had access to credit markets, or 
perhaps because they owned some land, while over time market imperfection 
might be eliminated, leading to sharecropping disappearing locally.19 
 
17 Roumasset, “The Nature of the Agricultural Firm”, 161—77.   
18 Ray, Development Economics, 564—68 ; Hayami and Otsuka, The Economics of 
Contract Choice, chapter 5.     





 By contrast, too little attention has been given to two other factors that 
influence the nature of contracts in viticulture.  First, contract choice needs to 
be linked to the nature of vertical co-operation and integration associated with 
the production and marketing arrangements of individual crops and livestock. 
The literature assumes that the landowner was indifferent to receiving payment 
in cash or kind, but while this might have been the case with crops like cereals 
where spot markets existed, it was not with crops which required immediate 
processing demanding a high degree of vertical coordination.  Therefore, 
decisions on contract choice sometimes carried important implications on the 
extent that they were to be involved in downstream operations associated with 
processing and marketing farm produce.  A second factor is the role of human 
asset specificity in long term contracts.  These contracts allowed sharecroppers 
to become more productive as they accumulated human asset specificity linked 
to the land, which encouraged them to undertake non-observable investments, 
especially important as new biological technologies were often needed just to 
maintain yields.20   These restrictions are especially important in the case of 
vines, which were often grown on hillsides under specific conditions and 
difficult to mechanize until the 1950s.  Long term contracts reduced the 
incentives for tenants to overexploit assets, such as existed with short-term 
ones.  Long term contracts and high human asset specificity have however an 
important drawback, which is the absence of a farm ladder or life-time earning 
patterns.  It implied therefore that stable lifetime incomes for tenants, and a 
guaranteed skilled labour force for the landowner, could end suddenly if the 
contract was brought to a premature conclusion. 21   
 
CONTRACT CHOICE IN COMERCIAL VITICULTURE SINCE 1850 
 
20 Oriana Bandiera, 'Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land 
Tenancy Agreements', Journal of the European Economic Association 5, no. 5 (2007), 
956—7 stresses the importance of non-observable investments.  
21In the US South, the contract is usually explained as a rung on a farm ladder that saw 
the tenant move from labourer, to sharecropper, tenant and finally landowner, as they 
accumulated capital, skills and reputation over their working life. Lee Alston and 
Joseph Ferrie, 'Time on the Ladder: Career Mobility in Agriculture, 1890— 1938,' The 





Problems such as the division of harvest, the tenant’s desire to multi-crop to 
reduce risk, or the monitoring of effort on highly fragmented plots, all help 
explain why sharecropping was comparatively rare.  In France, according to the 
official statistics, only 8.3% of the total area of vines in 1892 were cultivated 
using sharecropping contracts, and these were concentrated in a few regions.22  
Spanish statistics on contract choice are very poor, but sharecropping appears 
to have been rare, and geographically highly concentrated.23  In Italy, 
sharecropping was more widespread, but rarely used in commercial viticulture, 
despite the crop representing 20% of total agricultural output in 1911.24   
Therefore, how were vines cultivated if sharecropping was so rare? By far the 
most common were owner-occupiers who made their own wines, generally of 
low quality, using only family labour.  However, fine wines were often made on 
large estates, and specific labour contracts were more common than 
sharecropping or fixed rent tenancy.  Finally, from 1860 technological change 
allowed significant scale economies in viticulture and the possibility to enjoy 
low cost production even using wage labour and sharecropping occasionally.   
 The typical organization structure in the late nineteenth century was a 
family operated vineyard making its own wine, much of it consumed by the 
family. Increasing amounts however were sold to wholesale merchants, who 
blended it for the hundreds of thousands of small retailers in urban areas to be 
sold as common wine.25  Fine wine production was organized differently, since 
there was a strictly limited area of favourable land to produce them, and 
considerable care was required in carrying out the different activities. This led to 
landowners creating sophisticated labour contracts to resolve problems of moral 
hazard and monitoring, and creating incentives for vineyard workers to acquire, 
and utilise, human asset specificity.   Fine wine production also needed large 
amounts of capital as producers deliberately reduced output to improve quality, 
and high quality winery equipment was needed.26 Sharecropping could have 
 
22 Connord, La terre des autres, 44—48.  
23 Zoilo Espejo, Costumbres de derecho y economía rural, (Madrid, 1900).  
24 Federico and Martinelli, “Italy to 1938”, table 5.1.  
25 Sempé, Régime Économique Du Vin. Production, Consommation, Échange 
(Bordeaux and Paris, 1898), 104—06.  





provided the high levels of human asset specificity that were required, but its 
use was absent in Bordeaux and Champagne, and vineyard workers lacked the 
skills and capital required to transform quality grapes into fine wine. Fine wine 
producers also wanted to protect their brand names, and therefore did not want 
sharecroppers to be able to sell their share on the market. As a result, the 
landowner kept the whole harvest and hired skilled wine-makers, while 
vineyard workers received high wages. In Bordeaux, the prix-faiteurs were 
given the responsibility on the large estates for all the skilled operations on a 
fixed area of vines. In Burgundy it was the vigneron a prix d’argent, while the 
Champagne maisons outsourced the production of their grapes to small 
growers, although under their supervision.27   
But even in the case of common wine, new technologies changed the 
nature of vineyard supervision and reduced transaction costs between 1860 and 
1914, encouraging the creation of large estates and use of wage labour and 
sometimes sharecropping contracts, especially in the French Midi.28 In the 
Midi, economies of scale began to be important on vineyards of over 30 hectares 
that were established on the fertile plains rather than the hills, and growers used 
large quantities of pesticides, fungicides, artificial fertilisers, irrigation, and light 
pruning to improve yields (Carmona y Simpson 2012). As wine prices fell 
relative to wages from the late nineteenth century, some landowners turned to 
sharecropping contracts to reduce costs. However, in the years of poor harvests 
and low prices in the early 1900s, landowners were obliged to provide a 
guaranteed salary to their sharecroppers, limiting the interest in the contract.29    
These factors suggest why sharecropping contracts were not widely used 
in commercial vine cultivation. Yet in a few important wine regions, notably 
Beaujolais in France, Tuscany (Chianti) in Italy, and Catalonia in Spain, 
sharecropping was the most common contract. Furthermore, it managed to 
survive the profound technical and commercial changes in wine production over 
several centuries, and remained important until after the Second World War.   
 
27 Carmona and Simpson, “Explaining Contract Choice”, 896—98. 
28 James Simpson, Creating Wine.  The Emergence of a World Industry, 1840—1914, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press:2011). 





At first glance, this could be the only element in common for the very different 
contracts, especially with respect to the degree of specialization and the share of 
the production delivered to the owner. Nevertheless, sharecroppers in all three 
regions worked for large landowners who centralized the production process of 
all or part of the harvest, and produced a medium quality wine for the market. 
The rest of the chapter shows how this type of organization solved the problems 
of transaction costs associated with the supervision of work, management, and 
the division of the harvest, together with the incentive structure for 
sharecroppers. 
The vigneronnage.  
 
The vineyards of Beaujolais were close to navigable water and viticulture 
from the seventeenth century grew rapidly in response to the Parisian market 
(map 1). The region, in particular Haut (northern) Beaujolais where the hillside 
was especially steep, benefited from a growing reputation and high prices from 
the mid nineteenth century.30 Sharecropping represented between 30 and 40 
per cent of all vines of the département of Rhône in 1882, but reached 80 per 
cent in the district of Villefranche-sur-Saône, in the north.31  Beaujolais wines, 
although inferior to French fine wines, were called le grand ordinaire de 
France, and large landowners using sharecropping obtained prices that were at 
least double what owner-occupiers achieved in the same region, with the 
difference increasing between 1850 and 1940.32  From the 18th century, just as in 
Catalonia, landowners started to market their own wine.33 In fact, land 
concentration and sharecroppers continued to increase from the late nineteenth 
 
30 Gilbert Garrier, Paysans Du Beaujolais Et Du Lyonnais: 1800—1970. (Grenoble, 
1973), vol.1, 270, notes that planning vines (the minage) cost between eight and ten 
times more than further south. 
31  Pierre Galet, Les vignobles de France, vol. 1 : Méditerranée, Rhône-Alpes, 
Bourgogne, Franche-Comté, Alsace-Lorraine, (Paris,  Éd. Tec & doc: 2004), vol.1 1100.  
The area of vineyards in Villefranche increased fourfold from 6,643 hectares in 1927, to 
26,396 in 1905.  
32 Jacques Burel, Le Vignoble Beaujolais (Lyon: 1941), 71—2.  





century until 1940, especially for the better wines.34  By contrast,  sharecropping 
stopped being used for cereal production in the same area from around 1800.35  
MAP 1.  
 
Source: Meloni and Swinnen, Trade and Terroir, Figure 8.  
A typical property in Beaujolais had between 12 and 40 hectares of vines, 
which were sub-divided and cultivated by between five and fifteen 
sharecroppers in standard units called vigneronnage.36 Tenants were given 
about two hectares of vines, and one and half hectares of pasture for livestock, 
sufficient to keep a family and domestic servant fully employed. The 
sharecropper was required to reside on farm, and the family prohibited from 
working elsewhere. Although the milk, butter and cheese production was of 
poor quality, they provided an important dietary supplement, and helped them 
survive phylloxera or moments of abnormally low wine prices. 37 If the 
sharecropper owned land themselves, they were expected to rent it to others.38 
Landowners were responsible for all the major production decisions, including 
the choice of grape varieties and pruning methods used, as well as the timing 
 
34 Especially during the mid-19th century. Garrier, Paysans., vol.1, 605 and vol.2, table 
6.  
35 Garrier, Paysans., vol.1, 269.  
36 François Myard, Le vigneronnage en Beaujolais (Lyon, 1907). 
37 Humbert Chatillon, Le Beaujolais Viticole (Paris: 1906), 67. 
38 Cheysson, L’habitation du metayer vigneron du beaujolais autrefois et aujourd’hui 





and methods to be used in replanting after phylloxera (1875—90), the degree of 
mechanisation, and when to begin the grape harvest.39  Landowners often 
advanced capital because of the high cost of harvesting for the sharecropper, 
and sometimes crops destruction by hails. However the role of the sharecropper 
was decisive. The hills and the high density of vines made viticulture in 
Beaujolais especially labour intensive and mechanisation expensive. The 
sharecropper was responsible not just for working the vines, but also in 
supervising the harvest and wine making, which could involve as many as 
twenty people, and was required to be married, so that his wife would provide 
food for the workers. 40 Contracts were annual, but the hilly nature of the terrain 
led to high levels of human specificity, and explains why most sharecroppers 
remained for long periods, sometimes for several generations, on the same 
farm.41  
The landowner played a crucial part in the wine making process.   The 
harvest was collected rapidly, and sharecroppers made the wine using their own 
equipment although, to avoid cheating, this was always located within the 
landowner’s winery. Sharecroppers were not allowed to have wine making 
equipment in their own cellars, and the wineries of large estates had to 
accommodate more than a dozen of wine presses. 42   Wine-making was 
managed personally by the landowner or  their agent, and the wine from each 
vat after fermentation was divided by somebody considered independent, with 
the landowner and sharecropper both present.43 Only then could the 
sharecropper took possession of their wine, to either sell in the market or to the 
 
39 Myard, Vigneronnage, 208—9.  Connord, La terre des autres, 52, the increasing 
landowner participation in sharecroppers’ expenses.  
40 Myard, Vigneronnage, 193. The harvest represented about 25 to 30% of the 
sharecropper’s annual farm costs.  Garrier, Paysans, vol. 1, 391. 
41 Garrier, Paysans, vol. 1, 152—3. An enquiry carried out in 1898 showed that some 
families were working the same farm for more than 150 years. Myard, Vigneronnage, 
305.  
42 Paul Ferrouillat and Charvet, Les celliers: construction et materiel vinicole avec la 
description des principaux celliers du Midi, du Bordelais, de la Bourgogne et de 
l'Algerie (Montpellier; Paris, 1896), 380 and Cheysson, L’habitation, 230.  





landowner.44 Although these measures helped reduce monitoring costs 
associated with dividing the harvest, they increased production costs compared 
to large growers without sharecroppers.45  
An important feature of the contract for landowners was that labour costs 
were born by the sharecroppers, including those of the harvest and wine 
making. Therefore, when the poor harvests and exceptionally low prices of the 
1900s ruined many sharecroppers, landowners had to offer a different contract 
called grands gages, which guaranteed a salary.46 These contracts were similar 
to the prix-fait found in Bordeaux or the vigneron a prix d’argent in Burgundy, 
although they contained only limited incentives for good work for the 
sharecropper.  While both landowners and tenants might have preferred 
sharecropping contracts, fixed wage contracts were an acceptable substitute 
when market conditions were especially volatile, and tenants required a 
guaranteed income.  
Finally, the vignerons might have preferred to be landowner-occupiers 
themselves.  In fact, sharecroppers owned very little land, just 1,5 % of the 
Beaujolais land market during the nineteenth century, less than day labourers.47  
Sharecroppers were able to save money after the First World War, but land 
concentration continued to increase during the interwar period. 48 Not only did 
small growers lack the skills to produce quality wine and the capital to establish 
a cellar, but there were economies of scale associated with marketing it.49 One 
possibility was to move down the quality ladder, which had the added advantage 
of requiring less labour. Indeed, on the plains of the Bas-Beaujolais, which were 
well suited to mechanisation and producing large quantities of cheap wines, 
 
44 Garrier, Paysans, vol. 1, pp.390.  
45  Wine making at Château Malescot in Bordeaux in the late nineteenth century for 
example cost 437 francs per hectare, against 657 francs on the Deleche estate. 
Ferrouillat and Charvet, Les Celliers, 360 and 388. 
46 Vermorel and Danguy, Les vins du Beaujolais, du Maconnais et du Chalonnais., 
(Dijon, 1894), 17 and Myard, Vigneronnage, 262—3. 
47 Garrier, Paysans, vol.1, 360.  
48 Garrier, Paysans, vol.1, 605.  
49 Hubert  Clique, Les Caves Coopératives De Vinification En Bourgogne (Paris: 1931), 





sharecropping was less common and disappeared after 1900. However, the area 
of vines here also declined, because production costs were high compared to 
those of the Midi with which it competed.50 Sharecropping in Beaujolais was 
therefore linked to the production of better quality wines requiring the presence 
of a specialist wine maker to supervise operations, and the need for a labour 
intensive viticulture to provide a supply of suitable grapes. Yet the northern 
Beaujolais was an exception: its wines were superior to most other French wines 
(although inferior to those of Bordeaux or Burgundy where direct cultivation 
was practiced). Landowners were highly active in monitoring both the grape and 
wine making process, as well as selling the wines.51 Sharecroppers preferred 
increasing human asset specificity than moving to other wine-producing regions 
and becoming owner-occupiers. Despite the advantages, landowners in times of 




The rabassa morta.  
The rabassa morta began to be used throughout Catalonia from the end 
of the seventeenth century to meet the rapid expansion in demand for wines and 
spirits.  Most contracts were found in the districts where vines were planted on 
the hillsides, especially in the province Barcelona and parts of Tarragona. In 
many municipalities, such as the Penedès, between 60 to 80% of all vines were 
cultivated by sharecroppers in 1920 (map 2).52  Landowners were able to obtain 
a common wine of better quality and price compared to those produced by the 
new large cooperatives which started appearing during the first third of the 20th 
century and, despite the intense conflicts that confronted rabassers with the 
 
50 After the phylloxera, vineyards in the Bas Beaujolais declined by 25 % compared to 
an increase of 18% in Villefranche. Garrier, Paysans, vol.1, 429.  
51 According to Goujon, most of them were négociants, or needed a professional 
manager to supervise the cellar. Paul Goujon, La cave et le grenier: vignobles du 
Chalonnais et du Maconnais au XIXe siecle (Lyon, 1989), 216.  
52 According to Raimon Soler-Becerro, Viticultura, desigualtat i conflicte agrari. La 
lluita per la terra a la Catalunya vitícola, 1900—1936, (URV, 2019), Annex 5, in 26 





landowners, the contract seems to have reached its greatest geographical 





MAPA 2.    
 
Source: Colomé et alii, “The Rabassaire Struggle, Figure 3.  Based on Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales, La Rabassa morta, cartograma.  The shaded area shows the district where viticulture 
was the dominant crop and more than half cultivated using the rabassa contract.  
 
The rabassa morta contracts originally required the grower or rabasser 
to clear the land, normally marginal and wooded, and to plant vines within a 
fixed period (usually between two and ten years), to cultivate them in 
accordance with the customs of the region and to hand over between 1/5 and 
1/3 of the annual harvest to the owner.54 The farms covered between 2 and 4 
hectares, often in different plots cultivated by a single sharecropper. The 
contracts were originally valid until two-thirds of the vines had died and, in 
theory, this implied that the contacts were indefinite, lasting for generations.55   
 
53 Juan Carmona and James Simpson, “Cuando el rentista no es derrotado. El caso de la 
rabassa catalán, 1890—1936”. WP Historia Económica,(Instituto Figuerola- UC3M, 
2020), table 1 
54 Emili Giralt, “El conflicto “rabassaire” y la cuestión agraria en Cataluña hasta 1936”, 
Revista de trabajo, 7, (1964), 51—72.  





Several reasons explain how the contract was successful in reducing the 
different types of transaction costs associated with sharecropping. On the one 
hand the absence of economies of scale in traditional viticulture and the scale of 
wine making was low enough to allow sharecroppers to produce their own 
wine.56  Moreover, by guaranteeing a separated possession of the vines from the 
land,  including the right to sell them, the contract provided strong motivation 
for its proper care. Monitoring was therefore enforced through the market, and 
gave  ‘high powered’ incentives to apply more labour in the vineyard rather than 
in other activities, in contrast to Beaujolais.57 The use of a sharecropping instead 
of a fixed-rent tenancy contract had a major advantage in that it avoided the 
problem of establishing a rent which satisfied both tenants and landlord. It also 
allowed landowners the necessary grapes to produce and sell their own wine. 58  
Finally the application of the contract, generally oral, rested on the existence of 
a social capital that avoided short-term opportunism and ensured the survival of 
the contract for generations. 59 It should be emphasized that the clearing of the 
marginal land to plant the vines, and the fact that a vineyard took at least four 
years to produce a substantial harvest, explains both the low rent and the 
relatively high value of the vineyard compared to the land.   
Land concentration in the wine districts was very high and increasing, 
allowing the landowners, even if receiving a relatively small share of the total 
harvest, to be in the position to process a significant amount of wine.  Initially, 
quality was not relevant, because exports from the region consisted of 
aguardiente (spirits), rather than. However, the building of new roads 
connecting the vineyards with Barcelona and other ports by the early nineteenth 
century allowed growers to switch to the production of table wines, thereby 
obtaining better prices. Better quality wines were initially achieved without 
technological change, but wine production was increasingly centralized in the 
 
56 Carmona and Simpson, “The Rabassa Morta”, 297.  
57 Carmona and Simpson, “The Rabassa Morta”, 293. 
58 Carmona and Simpson, “Explaining Contract Choice”, Among recent works, Garrido, 
“Sharecropping” or Josep Colomé, Jordi Planas, Raimon Soler-Becerro and Valls-
Junyent, “The Rabassaire Struggle: Long Term Analysis of a Social and Political 
Movement”, International Review of Social History (2018), ignored the role of 
landlord as winegrowers.  





wineries of the mas, under the supervision of a masover, with the landowner, 
who usually lived locally, also taking an active role. 60 The appearance of new 
vine diseases and pests, especially the destruction of the entire vineyard by 
phylloxera between 1880 and 1900, led to greater involvement of growers in 
grape production. Landowners and sharecroppers maintained the contract, 
despite the opportunity offered to the landlords to recover the land when two 
thirds of the vines died. However, the planting and cultivation of the new 
American strains was more capital intensive and needed chemical fertilizers, 
which further increased the intervention of the landowner. 61  As in Tuscany or 
Beaujolais, the particularities of a mountainous orography which made 
mechanization difficult, explains the importance of the human capital specificity 
and therefore the landlord’s interest to maintain the long duration of the 
contracts. 62 
Despite the difficulties created by low wine prices during the interwar 
period, the landowners’ wineries using the rabassa morta contract were more 
successful than the cooperative wineries that spread throughout the Catalan 
wine-growing areas from the early 20th century.63  As in Tuscany, cooperatives 
had more difficulties to establish themselves in areas of sharecropping. These 
cooperatives, despite having modern facilities and enjoying enormous 
economies of scale, had problems competing with low costs regions such as La 
Mancha. In particular, while Catalan cooperatives failed to supply economic 
incentives to independent growers to improve grape quality, large growers using 
sharecropping contracts were able to internalize the quality through vertical 
integration of the different farms in their property.  The rabassa morta contract 
clauses allowed the landowner to enter the farm in order to supervise the 
different tasks, to fix the harvest date, and to control the wine processing in the 
 
60 Most landlords were growers who advertised in the trade directories and sold in 
Barcelona's expanding market (Carmona y Simpson, 2020).  The residence of 
landowners based on Soler-Becerro, Viticultura, annex 2.  
61 Carmona y Simpson, “The Rabassa Morta”, 303—4.  
62 Giralt, “El Conflicto”, 56—57. 
63 For Catalan cooperatives, Jordi Planas, “Els inicis del cooperativisme vitivinícola”, 
ed. Colomé et alii, Vinyes, vins i cooperativisme vitivinícola a Catalunya, (Abadia de 





vats of each sharecropper. 64 This supervision benefited indirectly the rabassers 
themselves, allowing them to produce better quality wines and explaining their 
reluctance to join the cooperatives, considering that their product was of better 
quality.65 Landowners were also able to make marketing decisions 
autonomously, having the ability to control their product, while cooperative 
managers usually struggled to justify their decisions before the partners given 
the large prices fluctuations.66 
 
Figure 1. Trend in wine prices and wages in Barcelona, 1866—1934 
 
Source: Simpson and Carmona, Why Democracy Failed, Figure 9.1.  
 
However, as in Tuscany, the increasing costs of chemical products and 
depressing wine prices from the early twentieth century decreased the return on 
unit labour input in viticulture compared to what unskilled wage labour in 
industry could earn, especially in the rapidly growing city of Barcelona whose 
population quadruplicated between 1887 and 1930 (Figure 1).  Although yields 
per hectare were somewhat higher than in other areas of Catalonia, unlike the 
 
64 Mancomunitat de Catalunya, Projecte de regulació dels censos, rabassa morta i 
terratge a Catalunya (Barcelona: 1923), 38—47, Instituto de reformas sociales, La 
‘Rabassa morta’ y su reforma, (Madrid:1923).  
65 Jordi Planas, Viticultura i cooperativisme. La comarca d'Igualada, 1890—1939, 
(Barcelona, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat: 2013), 384—85, notes that few 
sharecroppers joined cooperatives. 












































































































Beaujolais there is no evidence that the price differential obtained by the 
landowners increased during the interwar period and made it possible to 
compensate for the fall in the relative prices of wine with respect to labour.67 
The fact that sharecroppers processed a greater share of the harvest, and their 
autonomy explain that, unlike the Tuscan case, the demands of sharecropper 
organizations such as the Union de Rabassers created in 1923, were not limited 
to an improvement of the expenses and products distribution, preserving the 
centralized processing system, but adopted a more radical stance with the 
demand of a full land ownership at the expenses of the farms unity.68  As a 
result, the passing in 1934 of a Land reform legislation (Llei de contractes de 
conreu) brought the possibility for sharecroppers to substitute the payment of 
rent in grapes for another in cash and to redeem their farm and which would 
have supposed the potential disappearance of the large private wineries.69  
 
THE MEZZADRIA PODERALE IN TUSCANY  
The mezzadria poderale, was a medieval sharecropping contract, widely 
found in the provinces of central Italy, particularly in the mountainous regions 
of Tuscany, Umbria and Marche. In a similar way to the large French métairies, 
farmers practiced a multi-cropping (polyculture) and self-sufficient agriculture. 
In the case of Tuscany, and more specifically in the Chianti regions of Florence, 
Arezzo, Pisa and Siena, there was a growing trend towards wine specialization 
and the expansion of the contract between 1830 and 1940, while preserving the 
multi-cropping characteristics of the contract. Chianti, as in the case of 
Beaujolais, sold at a higher price than common wine, with a premium of up to 
 
67 Tenants would complain for the landlord’s failure to get good prices.   
68 A different interpretation is based on the increasing autonomy of the sharecroppers. 
For example, Ramon Garrabou, Jordi Planas and Enric Saguer,”Sharecropping and 
management of large rural estates in contemporary Catalonia”, Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 28, 3, (2001) 101. But the role of the landowner as grower is again completely 
ignored.    





100% in the 1930s, and in Italy in 1938 it represented 34% of premium wine 
produced in wineries of more than 500Hl.70 
Tuscany was a region of large estates, most of them being organized in 
self-sufficient farms (called podere) cultivated by sharecroppers (mezzadre), 
around an administrative centre (fattorie) with processing facilities. Despite its 
medieval origin, the maximum expansion of the fattorie occurs in recent times, 
quadrupling their number between 1830 and 1930 in Florence and reaching 
more than 60% of the province’s cultivated area.71 In Tuscany, 60% of the 
fattorie had more than 500 hectares, but in the more specialized wine-growing 
areas (such as Florence) the average was just 100 hectares with 10 poderes 
each72. Sharecroppers were offered annual contracts, varying in size from 6 to 
26 hectares, sufficient to support a family and perhaps a few farm servants, 
although larger farms were rarer in wine growing areas.73 The sharecropper was 
required to reside on the farm and, as in Beaujolais, the family prohibited from 
working elsewhere.74 The fattorie usually produced  variety of products, 
especially wheat, wine and olive oil, but the weight of each of them varied 
locally, and wine in the case of Chianti could represent a larger share  of the 
production value in 1900. 
MAP 3.  
 
70 Istituto Centrale di Statisticca del Regno d’Italia, Annuario Statisco dell’Agricoltura 
italiana 1936—1938, (Roma, 1939), 103. The % of quality wine in Federico and 
Martinelli, Italy to 1938, table 5.4. 
71 Rogari, Sandro, Le campagne toscane nel ventennio postunitario. Rivista di storia 
dell'agricoltura, vol. 2, 2009, pp. 99—107, 103; Istituto Centrale di Statisticca, 
Annuario Statisco, 103, and Ministro per la Costituente, Rapporto della Commissione 
económica, (Roma, 1947), 213. 
72 The Riccoli, one of the best known, had 2,000 hectares in 3 fattorie in 1838. Giulana 
Biagioli, “Storie di aziende agrarie”, in Marche. 7 (2016), 169—191, 177. 
73 Galassi, F. «Stasi e sviluppo nell'agricoltura toscana, 1870–1914: primiresultati di 
uno studio aziendale», Rivista di storia economica, 3, (1986) pp. 304–337. Giuliana 
Biagioli, “La mezzadria poderale nell'Italia centro-settentrionale in età moderna e 
contemporanea (secoli xv-xx)”, Rivista di storia dell'agricoltura, 42-2 (2002), 83. 






Source: Meloni and Swinnen, Trade and Terroir, Figure 6.  
Although sharecroppers enjoyed an ample autonomy to choose the crops, 
landowners could ask to increase the production of more commercial ones. 
Landowners could modify the size of the podere in order to adapt them to the 
introduction of a more labour-intensive crops, or a smaller family and, in 
certain cases, they supplied basic food in exchange for an increase in the 
production of commercial crops. 75 Landowners, with the increased 
commercialization of Tuscan wines in the national and international market 
from the last third of the 19th century, started to play a greater role in key 
production decisions, such as the choice of grape varieties needed to produce 
Chianti, the pruning system used or the control of the harvest.76 The fattorie 
were equipped with technicians or administrators, in addition to the 
involvement of the landowners themselves.77 Unlike in Beaujolais or Penedès, 
the vine was a promiscuous crop, especially in the Chianti production areas 
(99% of the vineyards of Florence in 1929) and the destruction by phylloxera 
 
75 Luporini and Parigi, “Multi-task Sharecroppping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria”. 
Economica, 63, (1996), 445—57. Biagioli, “Storie di aziende”, 185, Snowden, Frank, The 
Fascist Revolution in Tuscany 1919—1922, (Cambridge, CUP: 1989), 28 
76 Ricasoli's role in the definition of the varieties of grapes that make up the ‘Chianti 
Classico’ was crucial Biagioli, 2000. The Chianti and sharecropping, in Luca Mocarelli 
and Vaquero Piñeiro, “Viticulture in the Italy of the Mezzadria”, A History of Wine in 
Europe, (edited by Conca Messnia). (Palgrave: 2018), 232—36; on pruning, Galassi, 
“Stasi I Svilupo”, 322. 
77 In 1902, the demands for reform, called for a greater sharecropper participation in 
the major production decisions. Snowden, The Fascist Revolution, 52. Ministro, 





was delayed until the 1930s78. The cultivation was in general very labour-
intensive given the steep hillsides and dispersed vineyards. This made 
mechanization difficult and human specificity high, which explains why, despite 
the contracts being annual, farms were worked by the same families for 
generations.79 
Winemaking was originally carried out by both sharecroppers and 
landowners, but as wine quality and demand increased, it was carried out by the 
sharecroppers in the central winery under the supervision of the fattore, where 
the division took place.80 As the Chianti wine is a mixture of different varieties, 
it required great control.  Sharecroppers often took out loans with the fattore 
against commercial crops such as wine, which were  settled annually after the 
harvest.81 
The landowners of the fattories are closely linked to the production and 
export of Chianti, benefitted from their greater economies of scale in wine 
making, their capacity to produce a sufficient variety of grapes, and the 
advantages in marketing.82  Despite the growing criticism in the 19th century of 
the mezzadrie poderale because of its supposed inefficiency and conservatism, 
the number of sharecroppers increased as a share of the labour force, from 42% 
in 1882 to 55% in 1911. Just as in the Penedès, cooperatives did not compete 
with the private wineries in sharecropping regions.83 
In the same way as Catalonia, the major conflicts in the 1920s are 
generally attributed to the need for greater labour inputs,  higher expenses in 
chemical to fight phylloxera (which reduced sharecropper’s income), as well as 
 
78 Promiscuous cultivation was greatest in the Chianti production areas. Yearbook, 
1939, 272. Promiscuous cultivation as a way to reduce erosion in Dario Gaggio, The 
Shaping of Tuscany: Landscape and Society between Tradition and Modernity,  
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2017), 116.  
79 Evictions were very rare, although there was some mobility within the fattorie itself. 
Snowden, The Fascist Revolution, 30.  
80 Biagioli, “La mezzadria poderale”, 77—8 
81 Biagioli, “La mezzadria poderale” , 85 
82 Giulia Meloni, and John Swinnen , Trade and terroir. The political economy of the 
world’s first geographical indications, Food Policy, 81, (2018), 1—20 It was marketed at 
higher prices, (the price was double that of ordinary wine in the 1930s, Istituto Centrale 
di Statisticca, Annuario Statisco, 406—7. 





their loss of independence on the better managed estates.84  Moreover, the 
prohibition on working outside the poderale  became costlier as industrial 
wages increased.85 The most important conflicts occurred in Florence, in 1906, 
and after the First World War, with the triumph of the socialist party in more 
than half of the Tuscan municipalities.  Their demands included shifting the 
cost of chemicals to the landowners or the ending of payments for using their 
processing facilities.86  The expenditure on copper sulphate and sulphide to 
combat phylloxera could represent up to 15% of the value of the harvest in the 
first decades of the 20th century, increasing the debt of the sharecroppers to 
their landowner.87  However, in contrast with Catalonia, Tuscan sharecroppers 
wanted a greater participation in the management of the fattorie, keeping the 




Although sharecropping was rare in viticulture, it was widely found in the 
important European regions of Beaujolais, Chianti, and the Penedès, where the 
contract showed significant capacity to adapt to the profound changes in 
viticulture between 1830 and 1930. Geographical restrictions made viticulture 
especially labour intensive and limited mechanization in these regions, and 
explain the importance of human asset specificity and long-term contracts.  
Furthermore, landowners in the three regions centralized wine-making, 
allowing them to enjoy both the advantages of greater economies of scale, and 
the possibility to control the grape quality of their tenants.  However, their 
success was linked to being located in vicinity of Lyon, Florence and Barcelona. 
These were their main markets and were sufficiently close to the vineyards to 
avoid the need to create sophisticated marketing networks to sell their premium 
wines.  By contrast, if the local cooperative wineries enjoyed the economies of 
 
84 Biagioli, “La mezzadria poderale”, 65 
85 Luporini and Parigi, “Multi-task Sharecropping”, 455 
86 Ministero, 1947, 221; Biagioli, “La mezzadria poderale” , 92. and 66 
87 An average of the expenditure of 4 large fattorie at the beginning of the 20th century,  
in Galassi, “Stasi I Svilupo”, 324.  





scale to create these networks, they failed to create the economic incentives to 
improve grape quality, and their managers had problems to make autonomous 
marketing decisions.   
A further consideration is the increasing long term instability in the day-
to-day relations between landlords and vine growers.  The combination of low 
wine prices, growing capital requirements, higher opportunity costs of labour 
(because of industrialization) and the difficulties for exit, led to collective action 
to improve contractual conditions. In particular, the autonomy of 
sharecroppers, a characteristic of these long term contacts, was threatened by 
the greater involvement of landlords in the management of their estates.  As a 
result, the nature of vertical co-operation and integration associated with the 
successful wine production, especially in Catalonia or Tuscany, limited the 
possibilities to negotiate changes and devise alternative contracts. 
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